

RED CROSS RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT CONFLICT CONTINGENCY PLAN IN SOUTH SUDAN

Movement components / Responsible

HNS	IFRC	ICRC	PNS
SSRC	Juba Cluster	South Sudan Delegation	DRC, NLRC, GRC, FinRC, SwRC, SRC, NorCross, CRC

March 2025 to March 2026

To be reviewed after every 3 months

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1. BACKGROUND

Since independence in 2011, South Sudan continues to experience recurrent situations of conflicts and violence. Despite repeated attempts at peace agreements and cease-fires in 2015, 2017, and 2018, resulting into the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS). Although the unity government was formed under the peace deal, the security sector reforms have languished as skeptical as parties do not trust each other and the political violence and instability have persisted between government forces and opposition factions in the country.

The R-ARCSS roadmap remains largely unimplemented, especially the key provisions of the reunification of forces, permanent constitution making process (institutional reforms) and electoral preparations. There are serious doubts that any concrete impetus will be given to this process during the new extension phase

These setbacks forced the parties to the RARCSS to extend the lifespan of the agreement from 2022 to 2024 and again to 2026 (South Sudan postpones December election by two years | Elections News | Al Jazeera). It remains crucial to note that there has not been an election conducted in the country, whereas the country was scheduled for elections in 2015 political differences between the ruling party ensued over who should be the flag bearer, and that rift resulted in a civil war in 2013.

In early 2025, the political tension and violence have significantly escalated, jeopardizing South Sudan's peace process and political transition. There have been notable clashes between the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLA/IO) in the parts of Western and Central Equatoria state and Upper Nile region of Malakal where active fighting has since intensified. There are reports concerning airstrikes that have led to massive displacements of the civilian population.

The RARCSS has suffered acute sudden reshuffles without prior discussion with the parties concerned. There has been an increase in arbitrary arrests of several key opposition leaders and allies to (SPLA/IO) including their leader de-facto First Vice President Machar and effectively placed under house arrest. This situation has been exacerbated by the recent deployment of the Ugandan troops (UPDF) into South Sudan, which remains outside the framework of the RARCSS.

The efforts of the Region's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is mandated to deal with peace and security issues in South Sudan and the pressure from the international community has yielded no result.

South Sudan continues to face one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, magnified by the worsening effects of climate change, macroeconomic shocks. At the same time, the economic situation has deteriorated overtime with rapid rates of currency depreciation, hyper-inflation and high rates of unemployment. The country has continued to rely on importation of goods and services from within the region and has failed to maintain its domestic production. These challenges coupled with poor infrastructure i.e. roads, communications, healthcare systems continue to limit access to goods and services and the ability to improve productivity further exacerbating the economic situation.

1. Political dynamics

South Sudan political dynamics are complex, fragile, fluid and characterized by power struggle, ethnic tensions, civil conflicts, historical events and challenges in governance and electoral processes. The country remains in a fragile peace process with great obstacles to achieving prosperity and stability. The political dynamics have been influenced by a number of factors:

a. Nepotism

Nepotism has continued to contribute to conflict dynamics by fostering the existence of political patronage where power, resources and positions are distributed based on family ties and ethnic loyalties rather than merits or national interests. These practices drive ethnic divisions and create a sense of marginalization fueling resentments and tensions among the

populations. If left unchecked, nepotism not only hampers effective governance, but also exacerbates social fractures increasing the likelihood of renewed conflicts along ethnic lines.

b. Poor Governance

There is alleged poor governance by some sections of the society which can be linked to violence and conflicts by creating a vacuum of trust in the Republic of South Sudan and its institutions. According to the Transparency International 2024 Corruption Index Perception ([Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 - Transparency.org](https://www.transparency.org/cpi2024)), South Sudan ranks 180/180 further exposing the corruption status in the country. The perceived limited effective rule of law, accountability and transparency has been attributed to increase in corruption including diverting resources away from essential services e.g. healthcare, education and infrastructure. This purported mismanagement and unequal access to public resources deepens ethnic and state divisions as marginalized groups feel excluded from political and economic benefits. If these real or perceived grievances remain unaddressed, it may lead to escalation of tensions and violence without reliable mechanisms for conflict resolution which often manifests in armed confrontations and rebellion perpetuating a cycle of instability and violence.

c. Electoral processes

According to the RARCSS the electoral processes should be completed before the elections take place. Key processes agreed to ensure credible and fair elections include: reunification of **forces**, **Census**, reconstitution of the National Election Commission, Voter registration, permanent constitution and open civic space. Reunification of Forces is incomplete, so far, 50,000 unified forces have been graduated and a few deployed, with approximately 33,000 Forces yet to be trained and deployed. The delay in the full implementation of the unification of the forces has negative impacts on the election preparedness as the unified forces are to provide security during elections. Census: The last census was conducted in 2008 while South Sudan was still part of the Sudan. A national census **post-independence** and according to the RARCSS has not been conducted. Without census data, it will be difficult for NEC to determine the number of constituencies at local and national level, a key step in the achievement of the electoral process. Reconstitution of the National Election Commission: The National Election Commission (NEC) has been reconstituted and mandated to carry out the election preparedness. In 2024, in preparation for the national elections, a supplementary budget of 731.2 billion SSP was approved for NEC to expedite the election process. Despite these preparations, the elections of 2024 were postponed to 2026 due to limited funding, delay in voter & political parties' registration. Permanent Constitution: South Sudan has never had a permanent constitution and has been governed by various peace agreements including the Transitional Constitution of 2011, 2015 peace agreement and the RARCSS of 2018. In the past, breaching of the peace agreements by the various parties resulted in the outbreak of conflicts of 2013 and 2016. One of the key provisions of the RARCSS is the enactment of a permanent constitution. So far, the Constitutional Review Commission has been constituted, however, there has been limited progress. Delay in the achievement of a permanent constitution could hamper the ongoing peaceful transition and could fuel further confrontations. Civic Space: The civic space plays an important role in the electoral process to ensure access to electoral information and facilitate electoral engagement. The civic space has continued to shrink with recent enactment of the National Security Act that allows for arbitrary arrests.

d. Power struggle

The outbreak of conflict in 2013 and 2016 in the Country was perceived to be driven by power struggle and need for control of resources. The parties to conflicts are alleged to have exploited ethnicity differences and loyalties. These conditions have continued playing out in the present political environment where political/government appointments are perceived to be done on ethnic and political party considerations and to the exclusion of other ethnicities. The transitional government of the National Unity formed to work towards stability is marred by lack of trust on ongoing conflict activity and economic hardships by different groups that continue to operate outside of the established structures. These groups often represent ethnic interests and their existence hampers establishment of stable governance. Furthermore, uncertainty over the potential political succession plan may cause inter and intra-political tensions and conflicts. On the other hand, there have

been efforts e.g. Tumaini Initiative peace process, to bring onboard all political groups that are not party to the 2018 peace agreement. Major groups have so far joined this Tumaini Initiative with an exception of few that still have an active presence in the country. Furthermore, the failure of the Tumaini Initiative process has potential to exacerbate tensions and the risk of conflict.

2. Other situations of violence

a. Intercommunal and Intra-communal clashes

The long history of conflict has left many communities heavily armed and foster a culture of violence and mistrust. Over the years, South Sudan has experienced various forms of inter-communal and intra communal conflict and clashes mainly driven by the scarcity of natural resources, disasters and economic hardships. Increasingly, South Sudan continues to experience impacts of climate change that impact on availability and accessibility of natural resources such as water and pasture resulting in migration of communities to areas with available resources for their livestock. This movement leads to competition of natural resources between farmers and pastoral communities often resulting in land disputes, violence and conflicts. For instance, there have been recent border disputes in Greater Bahr El Ghazal, more specifically between Twic armed youth in Warrap State and Dinka-Ngok in Abyei Administrative Area, the border dispute in Marial Wau in Jur River County of Western Bahr El Ghazal State and Gogrial East of Warrap.

b. Cattle Raiding

Similarly, the country has witnessed recurrent cattle raiding frequently leading to armed clashes between the two groups. These confrontations often result in deaths and injuries, destruction of homes, unmet mental health needs, permanent disabilities, displacements and further ethnic tensions and hatred deepening cycles of revenge, particularly among different ethnic groups, further intensifying the unrest. The ongoing clashes and retaliatory violence have become a major driver of conflict in South Sudan, exacerbating existing ethnic divisions and social instability. Sometimes the existing intercommunal and inter-communal conflicts may be exploited by the political class to fuel further conflicts and violence.

c. Disaster Displacement

Disasters continue to cause widespread displacement across the country leading to widespread migration and settling of affected communities in new areas where they are met with confrontations and sometimes leading to violence and conflicts. Displaced populations are further affected by land grabbing of their ancestral home which further exposes them to violence.

3. Social-Economic

South Sudan continues to struggle with high rates of unemployment and a rapidly depreciating currency. The Country is highly dependent on humanitarian aid coupled with low production level and overreliance on importation of goods and services. The economy is heavily dependent on oil coupled with frequent disruptions of its production due to conflicts leading to an increase in economic instability. Without diversification of industries and opportunities for gainful employment and a bulging young population, coupled with hyperinflation, the country faces extreme economic hardships.

a. Unemployment and Inflation

Unemployment in the country is a significant driver of conflict, particularly among the youth. The unemployment rate has been a persistence issue, with the rate hovering 12% in recent years (<https://tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/unemployment-rate>). With limited job opportunities and high economic instability, many young people are left

frustrated and vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups or militia factions. The lack of employment also fuels competition for scarce resources intensifying ethnic tensions. Moreover, widespread unemployment undermines trust in the government and contributes to a sense of disenfranchisement, leading to social unrest and violence (https://www.ijrrjournal.com/IJRR_Vol.7_Issue.6_June2020/IJRR009.pdf). Over the years, the South Sudanese Pound has continued to depreciate among major world currencies leading to rapid reduction in purchasing power of the local currency. This continuous hyperinflation will lead to an increase in criminality and has potential to cause instability in the country as young people become more vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups.

4. Conflicts in the neighboring countries

South Sudan borders 5 countries including; Ethiopia, Sudan, Central Africa Republic, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. While South Sudan coexists peacefully with the neighboring countries, conflicts inside the border countries continue to pose a threat to peace and stability in South Sudan.

a. Sudan Crisis

The ongoing conflict in Sudan continues to have a profound impact on South Sudan affecting both humanitarian and security aspects (<https://www.uib.no/en/globalchallenges/176668/humanitarian-impact-sudan-war-south-sudan>). There is already evidence of the conflict in Sudan Spilling into South Sudan. For Instance, in January 2025, South Sudanese Residents of Wad Medeni were killed by Sudan Armed Forces when they recaptured the town from Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This incident led to widespread civil unrest in South Sudan, where Sudanese nationals and their businesses in major cities and towns were targeted (<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>). The instability in Sudan exacerbates the already fragile situation in South Sudan, leading to increased displacement and pressure on already strained resource competition.

b. Central Africa Republic (CAR):

The conflict in the Central African Republic has also had significant repercussions for South Sudan. The influx of refugees from CAR into South Sudan places additional strain on already limited resources and exacerbates ethnic tensions. The instability in CAR contributes to a climate of fear and uncertainty, making it easier for armed groups to recruit vulnerable individuals especially along the borders.

c. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the eastern regions, has a direct impact on South Sudan. The presence of militant groups such as M23 and other armed factions has led to increased violence and displacement. The instability in DRC has resulted in the movement of refugees into South Sudan, further straining the country's resources and exacerbating existing ethnic and communal tensions. Additionally, the conflict disrupts trade routes and economic activities, leading to increased poverty and unemployment, which are key drivers of conflict in South Sudan.

2. OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTINGENCY PLAN

The overall objective of this contingency plan is to prepare and strengthen the capacity of the Movement components (SSRC, ICRC-& IFRC) in South Sudan to anticipate and respond to humanitarian needs arising during conflicts and violence.

3. RISK FACTORS TO CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

There would be risk factors to conflict and violence outbreak given the current political dynamics and security situation in the country. Below are some of the risk factors for general conflict and violence.

a. Risk Matrix

Likelihood		Rare- Event occurs in exceptional circumstances (once every 2 years)	Unlikely- Event occurs at least once a year	Moderate-Event occurs at least once in 6 months	Likely-Events occurs every once a month	Certain-Event occurs weekly/every two weeks
Humanitarian Impact	Level	1	2	3	4	5
Negligible- Food insecurity continues to be a major concern. Low levels of displacements are experienced.	1	1	2		4	5
Low- Food insecurity continues to be a major concern. 6.1 million people are facing acute food insecurity by March 2025. An additional 1.6 million people are projected to face acute food insecurity between April and July 2025, bringing the total to 7.7 million people. Moderate levels of internal displacement.	2	2	4	Quick De-escalation of tensions between political elites	8	10
Medium – Food insecurity continues to be a major concern. 6.1 million people are facing acute food insecurity by March 2025. An additional 1.6 million people are projected to face acute food insecurity between April and July 2025, bringing the total to 7.7 million people. High levels of displacement persist, and many South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers in neighboring countries remain reluctant to return to South Sudan. Influx of displaced people from Sudan continues, further straining existing resources and provision of basic services like healthcare in host areas. Women and girls continue to face significant protection risks, including gender-based violence and sexual violence.	3	3	6		12	15
High- Widespread displacement- more people are internally displaced from their homes. Cross border migration is on the rise to neighboring countries. Protection concerns are raised with women and girls facing the risk of sexual and gender based violence.	4	4	8	Slow De-escalation of tensions between political elites 12	20	25



ICRC



South Sudan Red Cross



IFRC

<p>Humanitarian access constraints increase significantly as the civil war continues, and attacks on humanitarian convoys, staff, property and supplies become increasingly commonplace.</p> <p>Increase in cases (and CFR), morbidity and mortality from any of the ongoing outbreaks, particularly cholera, malaria, yellow fever and measles. Collapse of public health services and systems at national level causing surges in disease cases and deaths, specifically for water and mosquito-borne diseases.</p>						
<p>Very High-</p> <p>Widespread displacement- More cross-border displacement to neighboring countries. Previous returnees face renewed displacement and return to their previous host countries</p> <p>Heightened food insecurity, where the number of people facing IPC Phase 4 and IPC Phase 5 food insecurity outcomes increases. <u>Up to 100,000 people at risk of famine without intervention. Disrupted supply chains and destroyed crops/livelihoods.</u></p> <p>Increased protection concerns with a higher number of women and girls facing sexual violence.</p> <p>The health system, which is already highly reliant on humanitarian organizations, faces near collapse as several NGOs are forced to suspend their support to healthcare due to conflict.</p> <p>Humanitarian access constraints increase significantly as the civil war continues, and attacks on humanitarian convoys, staff, property and supplies become increasingly commonplace.</p>	5	5	Escalating conflict beyond the Sudan	15	South Sudanese widespread Civil Unrest	25

4. MOVEMENT PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CAPACITIES

SSRC has over 200 staff and 19,000 skilled, and unskilled volunteers. While SSRC invests in human resource development, staff and volunteer turnover inevitably means there is a constant need to train new staff and volunteers and provide refresher training for existing personnel to ensure they have up-to-date skills which can be applied effectively in case of emergency. There is a need to invest in training in all thematic areas, with a focus on SSRC volunteers. Emphasis will also be given to increase capacity in terms of conducting objective assessments, prioritizing needs and mounting integrated responses.

Regions	SSRC Staff	SSRC volunteers	NDRT trained. Staff & volunteers	Emergency Action Teams	Vehicles (HQs & in branches)
Greater Barh El Ghazal	30	900	20	120	08
Greater Upper Nile	30	1000	15	100	07
Greater Equatoria	45	1600	32	160	10

Based on the agreed headcount of 67 for the ICRC and Movement partners (IFRC/PNSs), a designated number of staff will be deployed to support the Movement's operations during the crisis. The exact number will depend on requests from the South Sudan Red Cross (SSRC), according to identified needs. Other Movement partners who will be working remotely will continue to support the SSRC through coordination efforts led by the IFRC and ICRC.

5. MOVEMENT PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STRATEGY

MOVEMENT PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STRATEGY

The overall management of the movement preparedness and response strategy will be coordinated by the Head of Programmes at SSRC HQ, SSRC technical departments at HQ, branch and with technical support from Movement Partners.

The SSRC remains crucial in providing a pivoted role to support the work in this Movement Contingency Plan and will utilize the full range of Movement support available to deliver the plan.

Under the Movement Coordination for Collective Impact Agreement (Seville Agreement 2.0 and in complementarity with the framework of Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) process in South Sudan, the SSRC will play its role as convenor in this response. This situation, therefore, presents a good opportunity to showcase that a coordinated Movement response can be delivered in this complex humanitarian environment. As part of this process and following commitments in the Mini Summit 20th March 2025 (joint statement and decision table) on the escalating conflict situation in South Sudan, all Movement partners have agreed to work towards a Movement Coordinated response and to support and resource it, including supporting the development of the NS's capacity to deliver. Hence, this response plan hopes to set up and follow through on:

- Agreed and shared needs assessments
- Complementary strategies and objectives
- Coherent and coordinated Movement response plans
- Coordinated plans for the monitoring and evaluation of implementation

At the country level, the SSRC will take on the role to facilitate and enhance coordination amongst Movement Partners (SSRC, ICRC, IFRC and PNS) with support of the ICRC and IFRC. This will be coordinated through the mechanisms of the Movement Platform and other coordination meetings in Juba, to discuss and take decisions on the response strategy and approaches, security and access, and communications. Movement Partners will adhere to the existing coordination agreements: The Movement Coordination Agreement, the Security Framework and the Public Communications Agreement. The plan will also be supported by operational and technical level coordination meetings.

It is important to use this emergency response to strengthen the capacity of the SSRC to scale up and respond in existing and new areas. The SSRC will be able to achieve this by having well-planned and coordinated support, building on the strength of Movement Partners. Therefore, promoting effective coordination with all Movement Partners is critical to the plan's success. Also critical is the sustainability of resourcing (funding or technical support) for this Movement Contingency Plan. Ensuring that this plan is well resourced is a top priority for SSRC to ensure that they can commit to the work.

5.1 Preparedness Strategy

SSRC has branches in all its 10 States and 3 Administrative areas in the country which are coordinated through the headquarters in Juba. SSRC branches are expected to customize this national contingency plan and develop their branch specific conflict preparedness and response plan. The SSRC will also foster preventive activities such HCiD (Healthy Care in Danger), Preventive networking with stakeholders, including through Safer Access campaign and First Aid training with security forces. The SSRC will also assess whether and how there could be some SGBV prevention activities.

The preparedness strategy of this plan leverages the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund [Civil Unrest DREF](#) allocation launched in January 2025 and ended in April 2025. This allocation was instrumental in providing immediate assistance, including household items, basic necessities, WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) support, psychosocial support (PSS), and first aid services to 8,948 displaced individuals (1,790 households) residing in temporary shelters. These individuals were directly affected by violent protests in Aweil, Bor, Malakal, Juba, Wau, and Tonj over the past three months

This contingency plan will be linked to South Sudan Red Cross Society business continuity plan (BCP) on how the NS will continue offering support to affected people in times of violence. The BCP involves several key components to ensure SSRC can continue its critical humanitarian work. The BCP will hence

- Establish protected zones for staff and beneficiaries, in line with international humanitarian law.
- Identify and prepare alternative operational sites if primary locations become unsafe.
- Equip staff to work remotely, ensuring they have access to necessary tools and resources.
- Partnerships: Strengthen partnerships with local organizations to support joint responses and resource sharing.
- Maintain communication with authorities to coordinate efforts and ensure compliance with legal requirements.
- Form dedicated teams to respond to crises, including first aid, logistical, and security personnel.
- Provide mental health support to staff and volunteers affected by violence.
- Continuously monitor the effectiveness of the continuity plan and adjust based on feedback and changing circumstances.
- Conduct regular drills to test the plan and ensure readiness.
- Ensure all actions comply with international humanitarian law, including the establishment of protected zones and the treatment of vulnerable populations.
- Implement strict safety protocols to protect staff and beneficiaries during violent incidents.

5.3 Scenario Planning

The Probable scenarios.

4.1.1 Best Case Scenario: Quick De-escalation of tensions between political elites

Likelihood: Moderately likely Humanitarian Impact: Low

The country is likely to experience disturbances in the areas considered tense for a short period of time. The ongoing activities related to political dynamics, other situations of violence, socio-economic factors and conflicts in the neighboring countries are resolved in a peaceful manner. Diplomatic efforts by IGAD and other countries in the region successfully de-escalate political tensions. Whenever additional disputes arise, they are settled amicably. Political parties are tolerant of dissenting views. Calm is restored in Nasir county and active hostilities do not spread to Malakal or other areas in the country. Other situations of violence are contained and resolved timely with minimal humanitarian impacts. All components of the RARCSS agreement are respected, fulfilled and finalized in a peaceful and transparent manner. Amidst de-escalation efforts, the risk of epidemics and extreme hydrometeorological emergencies continue to occur in the country requiring the national society to respond in accordance to the already existing operational plans ([Floods and Cholera Appeal](#) and Mpox- regional appeal).

4.1.2. Slow De-escalation of tensions between political elites

Likelihood: Moderately likely Humanitarian Impact: High

The country experiences sporadic disturbances and conflict in hotspot areas across the country resulting in injuries, loss of lives, displacement, and damage to infrastructure, livelihood, and assets. This is due to political intolerance, open hate speech and incitement of the public, ethnic divisions, detention of key political actors, breach of the key components of the RARCSS leading to risk of collapse of the peace processes and its instruments. There are complaints of abuse of Government resources, unpaid salaries, continued regional imbalances related to developments and appointments to public office. There is heightened tensions in conflict hotspot areas such as Wau, Juba, Yambio, Jonglei, Malakal, Bentiu and Aweil. Conflict and violence can be controlled by the armed forces and SSRC will be able to handle less cases affected in this Scenario. During disturbances, more than 90,000 people (30,000 families) are affected and need assistance. Ongoing sub-national violence, compounded by the economic crisis, contribute to food shortages, with an additional 1.6 million people facing acute food insecurity by mid-2025. The affected parties agree and manage the situation after several months of diplomatic efforts and engagement. While the risk of widespread conflict has been averted, persistent economic and security challenges continue to threaten the country's stability. In addition, the risk of epidemics and extreme hydrometeorological emergencies persist across the country in this scenario with potential escalation of the ongoing emergencies due to intensification of the conflict and violence.

South Sudan faces a national state of public health emergency with the aggravation of several of the ongoing health crises, including cholera, malaria, yellow fever, measles and polio. Scarce funding and the mix of climate and man-made shocks is responsible for increasing fragility in the health system including limited-service capacity, drugs and vaccines availability, and restricted access to medical services by vulnerable communities. Several counties and states in the Greater Upper Nile region continue to face several public health crises, with hundred thousand populations affected by water-borne disease, mosquito-borne diseases, malnutrition or a combination of all of them.

This scenario will have compounding impacts on the healthcare system with severe humanitarian consequences, with morbidity and mortality rates reaching an all-time high. The increased number of population movements and arrivals from neighboring countries have already over-stretched medical services provided in IDPs and Refugees camps, as well as host affected communities. Malnutrition rate due to the food crisis exceeds WHO extreme thresholds and worsens the ability for populations to recover from illnesses.

4.1.3.1 Most likely scenario: Worst case scenario: South Sudanese widespread Civil Unrest

Likelihood – Likely Humanitarian Impact -Very High

The country experiences widespread violence, political discontent resulting from tragic events happening to key political leaders, complete collapse of the RARCSS, civil unrest, arbitrary arrests, internal communal fights, cattle raiding, open regional imbalances and misuse of public resources. There is open confrontation of armed groups in all hotspot areas including **Greater Bahr Ghazal (Wau, Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Raja, Tonj) Greater Equatoria(Juba, Yambio, Tombura, Torit, Magwi, Kajokeji, Ikwoto, Terekeka, Mundri, Yei) and Greater Upper Nile (Bor, Pibor , Fangak, Pagak, Malakal, Nasir, Ulang Akobo, Renk & Bentiu)** with spillovers to other areas traditionally not hotspots for conflicts and violence. There is alleged ongoing open bias reporting by the media, increased disinformation and misinformation on social media and possibly leading to the closure of the internet and telecommunication networks. This widespread violence and conflict results in major injuries, loss of lives, livelihood and Property, widespread displacement, damage to infrastructure, assets, and disruption of daily routine resulting in over 2,000,000 (400,000 families) People affected. Consequently, Military from the region are called to support in Peacekeeping and the guarantors advocate for diplomatic means of restoring peace.

Neighboring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia face a significant influx of refugees as South Sudanese people flee the renewed conflict. The country's food insecurity worsens, reminiscent of the 2017 famine, with up to 100,000 people facing significant risk of starvation. Health services face near collapse as humanitarian organizations scale down operations, forcing civilians to rely increasingly on traditional medicine. Widespread human rights violations, with increased cases of sexual violence and limited support for survivors. A state of emergency is declared imposing curfews, movement restrictions and checkpoints, and international support is required. Situation gets unmanageable, more force used by organized forces, the Military, South Sudan National Security Services.

Agreed Overall Planning Figures:

- **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):**
 - Up to 200,000 displaced in and around Juba
 - Approximately 500,000 displaced across the country (urban centers and remote areas)
- **Cross-Borders:**
 - 500,000 South Sudanese expected to flee to neighboring countries, mainly Uganda and Kenya, with some movement toward remote border areas of the DRC
- **Persons Deprived of Liberty:** Between 500 and 2,000

Overall Affected Population: Estimated between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 people across the country

4.1.3.2 Worst case scenario: Escalating conflict beyond the Sudan based Armed Groups

Likelihood – Unlikely Humanitarian Impact – Very High

Hostilities in South Sudan escalates with renewed fighting in Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, driven by clashes between forces with differing political inclinations. The ongoing Sudanese war is raising concerns that it may spill over into South Sudan, with Sudanese military support one of the conflicting parties inflaming ethnic tensions. Neighbouring countries deploy special forces to protect the South Sudanese government. Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Sudan continues to destroy key oil infrastructure in South Sudan, severely impacting the country's oil exports. Negotiations with Sudan to resume oil flows intensify tensions, causing relations between Juba and Khartoum's authorities to deteriorate sharply. The humanitarian crisis worsens as a result of compounding shock. There is already limited access to the 9.3 million population requiring humanitarian assistance. The involvement of external forces raises the risk of a broader regional conflict, threatening South Sudan's fragile peace and regional stability.

6.0 SSRC PREPAREDNESS PLAN (MARCH 2025-MARCH 2026)

The SSRC has developed a preparedness and response plan covering 1 years (12 months) from March 2025 to March 2026. This plan is based on scenario 2 (most likely) as SSRC analysis points to the likelihood of outbreak of conflict and violence following the current political dynamics, social and economic situation, conflict in neighboring countries and other situations of violence across the country. This analysis is informed by community based early warning signs, active need for different parties to take up leadership roles and intelligence gathered from diverse sources. The plan is built on the need to anticipate, create awareness, prepare and subsequently respond.

6.1 Preparedness and Readiness

Preparedness entails developing an operational plan, building capacity in key State branches, networking and coordination, HCiD (Healthy Care in Danger), Preventive networking with stakeholders, including through Safer Access campaign and First Aid training, SGBV prevention activities, prepositioning non-food items, technical expertise, communication, and logistics. Preparedness activities will focus on ensuring SSRC institutional readiness through training of staff & volunteers, procurement & prepositioning of key supplies & materials, assessment and upgrading of critical infrastructure including communication, IT, warehousing and logistics. The activities are outlined below:

6.1.1 Health Care Activities:

- Training on FA for 20 SSRC Staff and Volunteer Emergency teams in 8 branches.
- Provision of 20 First Aid Kits & supplies and 20 stretchers per branch for 7 branches and HQ.
- Provision of essential drugs for staffs & Volunteers
- Identification of vendors for providing food and supplies during operations
- Awareness creation on HCiD (Healthy Care in Danger) through dramatization in coordination with ICRC

6.1.2 Protection Gender Inclusion Activities:

- Mapping of already trained volunteers on MHPSS, PFL and SGBV for referral pathways in collaboration with ICRC.
- Awareness on SGBV and MHPSS for 200 SSRC staff and volunteers in 7 branches and HQ
- Refresher training on RFL to 100 SSRC staff and Volunteers in 7 branches and HQ.
- Training of 20 staff and volunteers on dead body management to 7 branches and HQ each.
- Procurement and prepositioning of RFL/tracing materials (Phones, Red Cross Message, IEC materials, tracing forms etc)

6.1.3 Relief and Shelter Activities:

- Procurement and Prepositioning of 30,000 NFIs across 7 branches and HQ.
- Prequalification and recruitment of the financial service providers
- Assess and upgrade warehouse needs (retrofitting, stock taking, replenishing/stockpiling)
- Assess and upgrade Fleet needs (maintenance and servicing, hiring additional capacities)
- Mapping out Surge Support needs
- Cross border collaborations with NS bordering South Sudan (KRCS/ERCS/URCS)
- Refresher training for EATs in 7 branches and 2 NDRTs in two regions (Focus on SAF, Radio communications, DBM etc.).

- Procurement of PPEs for 7 EATs and HQ teams
- Procurement and prepositioning of Plump nuts biscuits for staff and volunteers
- Procurement of visibility materials (20 Emblem jackets for 8 locations, aprons for 8 EAT teams, big flags, stickers, visibility on SSRC premises)
- Promote local food production and cash programming.

6.1.4 Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Activities

- Installation of 10,000 liters water tank at the HQ (water harvesting/borehole)
- Procure two water truck and bladder (15,000 liters)
- Procurement and preposition of Mobile toilets (10 for HQ and 5 for each of the 7 branches)
- Procurement and prepositioning of 150 latrine slabs across 8 branches.
- Procure and preposition hand washing stations in 7 branches and HQ.
- Procurement and preposition of MHM Kits to 10,000 Women and girls.
- Procurement and preposition of WaSH consumables
- Map out existing capacities on hygiene promotions across 7 branches and HQ.
- Procurement and preposition of water treatment chemicals (Aqua tabs and Pur) at the 7 branches and HQ
- Preposition of 7 SETA (WaSH kit 5) and procurement and preposition of additional 2 Kits
- Emergency Sanitation and Hygiene refresher training for volunteers and staff from 8 branches (2 each)
- Emergency Water Supply: Treatment & Management refresher training for volunteers and staff from 8 branches (2 each)

6.1.5 Communication and Advocacy

- Mapping of key stakeholders (Presidency, Governors, Ministries, commissions, County and Payam authorities) and generate clear contact details
- Engagement of journalists and key influencers and establish clear contacts
- Conduct dissemination and Humanitarian Diplomacy- awareness linked to access with Key stakeholders at High level leadership. SSRC will engage with key stakeholders (RRC, local authorities, security agencies, communities) in the SSRC auxiliary role throughout the life of this plan.
- Awareness raising entails dissemination of the RC/RC Fundamental Principles, mandate and the role of SSRC, use and misuse of the emblem, promoting International Humanitarian and Rule of Law and relevant national laws. This will be conducted through radio talk shows/spots and social media.
- Procurement of visibility materials (Emblem jacket, T-shirts, caps, IEC materials etc.)
- Develop and disseminate Do's and Don'ts of communication during emergencies to all staff and volunteers.
- Internal refresher training of the crisis communication to senior management/board members.
- Dissemination of communication policy (CP) to staff, members, volunteers and board of SSRC

6.1.6 National Society Readiness Activities

- Check on workable communication means, gadgets VHF's (satellite phones across 7 branches and HQ) and develop contact lists (with their phone numbers) of all team leaders
- Installation of radio communication
- Recruitment of radio lead/tele-communications officer and radio operators in 3 locations
- Establishment/reactivation of SSRC radio communication frequency
- Develop a loss of communication protocol
- Safer Areas reinforcement and assessment across 7 branches and HQ (joint assessment with WaSH team)
- Safer Access Training for Staff and Volunteers across the 7 Branches and HQ
- Simulation exercises and drills across 7 branches and HQ (e.g. communication, evacuation plan)
- Installation of Blast film (3m) at the SSRC HQ
- Development of the Business Continuity plan (By DSG support services)- mapping out critical staff, movement/evacuation plan, maintaining minimum workforce, PNs support arrangements
- Development of Emergency procurement and financial procedure.

6.2. Detailed approach to the proposed activities:

6.2.1 Awareness raising activities

- **Increasing understanding of the Red Cross** among communities, particularly in hotspot areas using diversified approaches including use of radios, social media and community dialogues. Building on past work, SSRC volunteers will disseminate information on the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and the mandate of SSRC in their communities to enhance acceptance and safer access.
- **Increasing understanding of International Humanitarian and Rule of Law (IHRL)** among the law enforcers (including the police, army and paramilitary groups). This will promote an understanding of IHRL to increase awareness of SSRC and its independent/neutral role. The purpose of this is to curb excessive use of force by law enforcers in times of conflict and help reduce the number of attacks on hospitals, schools, ambulances and relief workers. Increased understanding of the IHRL and acceptance of the mandate of SSRC among law enforcers will help promote safer access to SSRC staff and volunteers.

6.2.2 Increasing capacity to meet basic Shelter, Non-food and Food needs

- SSRC will establish/activate 8 operational centers within the High-risk areas to improve operational efficiency in hard-to-reach areas.
- SSRC will increase its NFIs and shelter stock through procuring and prepositioning across 8 operational centers.
- SSRC will train volunteers and staff in each mapped priority area to ensure they have the requisite skills and material to undertake/support assessments and distributions.
- SSRC operational centers will establish and simulate resilient call out/coordination systems for volunteers and staff.

The operational centers will be as the following (highlighted)

S/N	State	NO. of hotspot Locations	Locations
1	Central Equatoria	06	Juba , Terekeka, Lainya, Yei, Kajokeji and Morobo
2	Western Equatoria	08	Yambio , Mundri, Maridi, Ezo, Tombura, Nzara, Iba and Mvolo
3	Eastern Equatoria	06	Torit, Nimule, Magwi, Kapoeta, Narus and IKwoto,
4	Lakes State	05	Rumbek, Cueibet, Rumbek East, Wulu and Yirol,
5	Jonglei	04	Bor , Old Fangak, Akobo and Lankien
6	Upper Nile	07	Malakal , Renk, Maban, Nasir, Ulang, Kodok and Maiwut
7	Northern Bhar Gazal	06	Aweil town (North) , Aweil East, Aweil South, GokMachar Nyamiel and Aroyo,
8	Western Bhar Gazal	04	Wau , Jur river, Raja, Baziya
9	Warrap	04	Kuajok, Tonj, Gogrial and Akon
10	Unity	07	Bentiu , Mayom, Guit, Koch, Leer, Mayiendit and Panyinjar
11	Administrative Areas	06	Abyei, Pibor, Boma, Likuongole, Pariang and Abiamnom

6.2.3 Capacity Building (Training)

- National Disaster Response refresher training will be undertaken. This course includes multi- sector preparedness, First aid, Safer access, dead body management and rapid assessment training.
- Branches in remote areas will be supported to upgrade and reinforce the warehousing capacity and security for effective management of emergency supplies. Where needed, additional staffing will be deployed to strengthen human resource capacity.

- Staff and volunteers will participate in various training including; safer access, First Aid, EAT refresher, SGBV/MHPSS & RFL orientation. Furthermore, staff and volunteers will be oriented on Do's and Don'ts during a conflict emergency. These training sessions will equip staff and volunteers with the necessary skills and knowledge on key areas to ensure delivery of quality interventions and duty of care.

Table: Preparedness Skills capacities and Gaps

Area	Trained Personnel Required	Currently Trained	Refresher train	Training required
Emergency Action Teams Training (EATs)	500	350 (Juba, Yambio, Wau, Bentiu, Malakal, Bor and Aweil)		
National Disaster Response Training	50	25	1	25
Safer Access Training	500	250	0	250
First aid/HCiD training for SSRC EATs and Security Forces	2,227 people (Males and 1,060 Females) in 2023	300 people in 7 locations (Juba, Yambio, Wau, Bentiu, Malakal, Bor and Aweil)	450 EATs	250
Dead body Management Training		5 trained in HQ 2 trained in Juba branch 20 trained in Yei		

6.2.4 Networking, Coordination and Collaboration Approach

In the context of a highly fragmented security, political, economic and social landscape that could be fueled by renewed fighting countrywide, that would affect those protected by our mandate, the roles of the three Movement components in responding to the impact of armed conflict and the violence are attributed in alignment with the Seville Agreement 2.0, with functions allocated based on the mandate, expertise and capacity of each component, adopting a pragmatic approach. The SSRC is the convener, taking a central and pivotal role in coordinating the Movement response. The ICRC is the co-convener of the Movement response in South Sudan due to the situation of armed conflicts, while the IFRC assumes specific functions and activities to support and complement the operational efforts to address the humanitarian needs associated with the renewed violence.

Before the current crisis, the Movement Partners have streamlined their collective response to armed conflict, consequences of violence in Sudan, natural disasters and epidemics such as the outbreak of Cholera, and this has proven to add value to the humanitarian response. In November 2024, the Movement components organized a Mini-Summit related to the Cholera outbreak and the convener (SSRC) and co-convener (ICRC) roles were attributed. With the escalation of armed conflict and violence, these attributed roles are confirmed.

The Movement Partners are maintaining and enhancing the well-established Movement coordination mechanisms on operations and security and ICRC will continue to provide security management support to the Movement Partners, based on Security Framework Agreements and bilateral security agreements.

SSRC security capacity, based on the Safer Access Framework continues to be reinforced by ICRC, IFRC and its membership as per existing and planned set up. The ICRC will, as much as possible, facilitate access to sensitive and conflict-affected areas to Movement Partners, helping in contacts with stakeholders. To optimize the Movement response,

ICRC will continue to support the SSRC in locations with limited SSRC presence due to conflict sensitivity, to the extent of its capacity and possibility.

6.2.5 Prepositioning of emergency equipment and supplies

- Procurement of NFIs and other emergency stocks, pre-positioned in operational centers to be used during conflict- violence when humanitarian response is required.
- SSRC will maintain NFI stocks for 5,000 households at national level and 25,000 NFIs among 7 SSRC branches.
- SSRC will request additional dead Body Materials to preserve the dignity of the affected population.
- The stocks prepositioned will remain in place and used to respond to other disasters. In this case, an additional report will be provided (at a point to be agreed after the initial response ends) to donors who have contributed to the plan showing how stocks have been used. Also, SSRC will activate all available funding through crisis modifiers to support this preparedness and response plan.
- To enhance communication flow, coordination and connectivity, SSRC will improve/boost internet connectivity by installation of reliable internet services and activate/reactivate radio communication in SSRC vehicles/ radio room.
- To ensure timely response, SSRC will deploy trucks to the 7 operational centers including and Juba to support operations
- SSRC will ensure timely funds transfers to the branches ensuring smooth flow of operations. In addition, SSRC will establish alternative accountability mechanisms.

6.2.6 Increasing capacity to provide clean, safe drinking water and sanitation facilities.

- Water treatment supplies and sanitation kits, water tanks, plastic latrine slabs will be prepositioned to make it possible for SSRC to provide access to clean, safe drinking water when communities get displaced due to violence.
- Volunteers trained in hygiene promotion will be deployed to operations to support hygiene awareness.
- SSRC will install additional water storage equipment and increase sanitation facilities in key SSRC offices where it is anticipated to receive displaced families.
- SSRC will procure water trucks and conduct water trucking to affected communities.
- SSRC staff and volunteers will be deployed to carry out rapid assessments in the affected areas, set up emergency water supply and sanitation, and cascade hygiene promotion to the affected communities. The rapid assessments will utilize the IFRC's 24 hour and 72-hour assessment tools.

Summary of WASH training

Area	Trained personnel required	Currently trained	Refresher training required	New training required

Emergency: Water Supply: Treatment & Management Sanitation and Hygiene	100	Wau-20, Aweil-50, Bor-20, Juba-5, Torit-20, Terekeka-5, Malakal-20 & Renk-30	Bentiu and Yambio not trained	Solid and Liquid waste
WaSH Kit 5	8	The following branches has each 1 kit (Torit, Wau, Renk, Malakal, Bor, Aweil, Bentiu & Old Fangak)	Juba and Yambio does not have	

6.2.7 Increasing capacity for basic emergency health services

- SSRC will map out referral pathways to refer to the affected population to access healthcare where possible.
- SSRC will train large numbers of SSRC volunteers and staff as well as community structures CDRTs on first aid.
- SSRC will deploy its trained staff and volunteers to provide first aid to injured people to promote life and prevent further injuries.
- SSRC in collaboration with ICRC will work closely with national and state hospitals with good surgical capacity to strengthen the referral system.

7.0 RESPONSE STRATEGY

SSRC response entails the operationalization of proposed interventions and activities at the onset, during and after the conflict and violence.

- This plan will adopt a strategy of deployment of already prepositioned capacities including both human resource and emergency supplies, to increase the speed and efficiency of potential response to affected areas.
- The rapid response will cover delivery of emergency humanitarian relief services across sectors. This includes joint multi-sector, rapid assessments (to support decision making process); first aid; emergency health care and medical evacuations, psychosocial support, Restoration of Family Links, distribution of shelter materials; distribution of non-food items to displaced populations; supply of clean, safe drinking water; provision of sanitation facilities, as well as hygiene promotion services, and coordination of humanitarian services.
- In coordination with RCRC movement partners, SSRC will respond to the needs as a result of conflicts-violence through activation of the Emergency Action Teams (EAT) and utilization of prepositioned stocks, equipment and technical expertise in all the SSRC branches and units across the country.
- SSRC will deploy NDRTs and international surge capacities to areas identified in the course of the emergency operation. The additional capacities of NDRT and International support is to enable SSRC to respond to the areas hard to reach but with critical needs.

7.1 The response strategy Activities

The response strategy will involve the following activities:

7.1.1 Health Care Activities:

- Deployment of 50 EATs and NDRTs to provide First Aid and PSS to the wounded and injured in each of the 8 locations
- Provision of emergency food for staff and volunteers during operations across 8 branches.
- First Aid: SSRC mobilization, deployment where needed, providing FA material and PPE, visibility materials, - Mobility means for volunteers
- Scale up Community Case Management of Cholera (RCCE & ORPs) and referrals to PHCs/CTUs

7.1.2 Protection Gender Inclusion Activities:

- Provision of Protection of Family Links through phone calls and tracing services across 8 locations- PFL services: with SSRC for the most vulnerable, unaccompanied minor (UAM), War Wounded (WW) and detainees- Phone calls' offers, - Hotline reinforced
- Deployment of staff and volunteers to provide SGBV/MHPSS services (Counselling, support to survivors, referrals) to survivors across the affected branches.
- Deployment of staff and volunteers to support the management of dead as requested by public authority across the affected branches. (MotD : with SSRC Information collection and assessment of sites- Rapid refresher for SSRC volunteers- Reminder (Public if need be) to the parties to the conflict of their obligations regarding the Dead MotD (part of the RDD).-Provision of equipment (PPE, and logistical means),- Collection of dead bodies, transportation, and storage (storage will be in a location managed by the authorities), and burials if needed,- Collection of data for proper recording.
- Conduct MHPSS to staff and volunteers before and after operations across the 8 locations.
- HCiD: SSRC reporting incidents of attacks and/or challenged access to health care.

7.1.3 Relief and Shelter Activities:

- Distribution of NFIs/shelter materials to displaced populations.
- Deployment of staff and volunteers to conduct rapid multi-sectoral needs assessments in affected areas across the 8 branches.
- Deployment of 8 trucks to 8 affected locations (including 8 drivers)
- Deployment of NDRT and Surge Support based on need.

7.1.4 Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Activities

- Conduct water trucking to the affected population.
- Deployment and operation of surface water treatment plants based on need
- Deployment of volunteers to distribute WaSH NFIs (including dignity/MHM Kits)
- Deployment of mobile toilets across the SSRC offices in 8 branches
- Construction of emergency Latrines
- Install hand washing facilities at the 8 branches and communities affected.
- Hygiene promotion by SSRC with support of movement partners
-

7.1.5 Networking and Coordination Activities

- Attend cluster coordination and internal meetings
- Activation of the SSRC National Taskforce Meeting (chaired by SG)
- Strengthen SSRC Emergency Operation Center (EOC) to manage with close collaboration and coordination of regional and headquarters.
- Continue maintaining cross border collaborations with the RCRC sister National Societies.

- Maintain close linkages and collaboration with interlocutors and office bearers at High level leadership (Presidency, Governors, Ministries, commissions, County and Payam authorities).
- Maintain effective and closer coordination and communication with ICRC Delegation on aspects linked to relations with security forces and Safer Access of SSRC responders.

7.1.6 Safer Access

- SSRC will deploy security rules emphasis on Do's and Don'ts during crisis to Staff and Volunteers
- SSRC will conduct comprehensive security analysis before deployment of staff and volunteers.
- SSRC will maintain robust evacuation plans to be activated immediately as needed for personnel during an operation.
- SSRC to maintain regular communication with key interlocutors and conflicting parties.
- SSRC to replenish safe areas and ensure accessibility to staff and volunteers.
- SSRC to deploy radio communications across SSRC vehicles and maintain communication with radio room.
- SSRC Field Co in coordination with ICRC to assess all field missions based on need.
- SSRC to issue key contacts to call in case of emergency to staff and volunteers in an operation.
- All SSRC staff and volunteers will have to sign and adhere to the Code of Conduct at all times when in Action.
- SSRC staff and volunteers engaged in an emergency operation will sign SSRC acknowledgment of risk.
- SSRC will inform staff and volunteers engaged in an emergency operation of all information related to the emergency including situation awareness.
- Provision of volunteer insurance cover.
- WEC: Support to the security of SSRC and Movement partners

7.1.7 Communication

- The SSRC will deploy mechanisms for media engagement based on need.
- Branches involved will provide periodical updates through formal communication channels to their reporting levels/headquarters and the E.O.C.
- SSRC E.O.C (with support of PMER/IM) to produce and share regular operational updates with the National Task Force (NTF) and RCRC movement partners.
- SSRC will maintain active communication between all deployed teams with their next level of reporting.
- In case of failure of communication, SSRC will deploy a loss of communication protocol.
- SSRC through the NTF will produce joint statements, press releases and reactive lines during emergency operations.

- Joint ICRC-SSRC COM crisis team to establish to identify potential perception risk as well as harmful information issues and formulate response plan, including messages; identify issues and trends that could impact our security or operations,
- Guidance to Movement positioning, visibility.
- The existing Movement Communication Working Group (WG) will jointly manage internal and external communication to the Movement, government, Humanitarian Community in South Sudan, and donor community.
- While coordinated communication will be fostered, individual partner communication will be shared with other Movement partners.
- The Movement Communication WG will draft internal and external messages to enhance the Movement's positioning and visibility, in accordance with the Movement Communications Agreement signed in 2021.
- The Movement Communication WG will identify and address harmful information - including misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech (MDH)- circulating in the media and on social media platforms. This will help anticipate potential perception issues and develop a response plan, including key messages. Additionally, the WG will monitor issues and trends that could affect security or operations.

7.1.8 Information Management

- The Information Management WG, consisting of IM & Data practitioners from SSRC, the ICRC, PNSs and the IFRC, will coordinate common information and data processes, tools, and products. The WG will work closely with the Communication WG.
- The WG will focus on improving operational information management processes, tools products and the quality of data behind them for the SSRC.
- Key joint information products to be developed, but not limited, will be a Movement Partners Situation Report and the development of the Movement Picture, in close collaboration with Movement counterparts.

7.1.9 Dissemination

- Along with the dissemination of this plan, SSRC Fundamental Principles, Values, IHRL and Mandate and roles in areas with active conflict will be intensified.
- Key messages will be prepared and shared with all SSRC staff, volunteers and board members concerned.

7.1.10 Monitoring

- SSRC will develop a robust M&E plan which will be updated regularly in line with the prevailing situation.
- SSRC EOC will maintain regular monitoring of the unfolding situation, trends and offer analysis into developing context.
- Narrative and financial reports will be produced and shared with all donors.
- SSRC will conduct After Action Reviews (AAR) with emergency teams engaged in the operation across the 8 branches.
- Movement IM: Reinforcement on IM WG- support SSRC on development of knowledge of processes and platforms (e.g. information flow, data and reporting processes, movement picture)

7.1.11 THE MOVEMENT IDENTITY

South Sudan Red Cross (SSRC):

The South Sudan Red Cross (SSRC) has been at the forefront providing life-saving assistance to conflict and crisis-affected populations across the country. It has a strong presence and network at national, state and community levels and is consistently working to build its capacity to consistently meet the dire humanitarian needs of the affected populations.

SSRC also has Emergency Actions Teams (EATs), composed of 20 – 25 volunteers, National Disaster Response Team (NDRTs) who have been trained in a range of disaster response, health and water and sanitation response skills, Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA), as well as in RCRC activities such as Restoring Family Links (RFL).

This current Movement Contingency plan will look to reinforce and work through these EATs, NDRTs and train additional volunteers to carry out these roles.

As such, the SSRC is well positioned, with support from Movement partners, to reach at-risk families. The aim of the plan is to enable SSRC to complement the interventions of ICRC (e.g. Protection), the support of IFRC and Partner National Societies (e.g. health, water and sanitation and Psychosocial Support-PSS), and the response from United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP) and from International NGOs (I/NGOs). This will be done through its staff, its existing network of highly motivated volunteers, as outlined above, and with technical and financial support from its partners.

The SSRC will fully engage and further reinforce its extensive network of volunteers and branch structure, to ensure proximity to communities for impactful response activities. The SSRC will steadfastly continue to enhance its operational and organizational capacities and development, with the collective support of the Movement Partners. The SSRC Network: Capitalize on and reinforce the SSRC extensive network of volunteers and branch structure, and their proximity to the communities to ensure impactful response activities. Expand this capacity as required. SSRC will focus on the followings activities/sectors:

- Health (RCCE, ORPs, First Aid and Referrals to Health Facilities)
- WASH (Hygiene promotion, emergency Sanitation facilities, NFIs and water supply)
- Communication: Develop Movement key messages and press releases as relevant.
- PGI: MHPSS for volunteers and war wounded population, dead body management and RFL.
- NSD: SSRC branches and units capacities strengthening via training and volunteers' management, logistics/vehicles support to branches.
- Knowledge of the context: Use local presence and knowledge to access and prioritize vulnerable populations.
- Previous experience: Make the most of the experience of previous emergencies and responses to implement its contingency plan and ensure the safety and protection of the staff and volunteers.
- Deployment of already trained Emergency Action Teams (EAT) and the National Disaster Response Teams to provide lifesaving assistance.

ICRC:

The ICRC has a longstanding operational history, identity, perception, and reputation in what is now South Sudan. Indeed, it has been active in southern Sudan then in South Sudan since the 1980s. Since South Sudan's independence in 2011 and subsequently the two major armed conflicts starting in 2013 and 2016, the ICRC has been a major humanitarian actor with widespread physical presence across the country, capacity to reach and operate in the most remote locations, providing access to key services, assistance and protection to large numbers of both conflict and violence affected populations. Based on these elements, the ICRC's identity in the event of a crisis can be outlined as follows;

- Maintain, leverage, and build ICRC's network of interlocutors in Juba and affected areas of South Sudan, both for security and operational purposes, to enable its response and the overall Movement response during the crisis and keep safe. Dialogue with UPDF to be closely coordinated with URB. Initial priority will be to secure and safeguard ICRC's capacity to operate in and around Juba, without which operations across the country will be seriously hampered or impossible. In a first phase (and without immediate reinforcement) ICRC flying teams, with the possible support of members - essential staff - of the relevant coordination teams, would redirect their attention to Juba and surroundings, strengthening the operational capacity of the delegation there as a precondition. The delegation expects the initial phase of the crisis to be characterized by high levels of unpredictability and insecurity.
- Deliver upon the ICRC's protection mandate, reinforcing areas of already well-established protection dialogue in South Sudan (Detention, PFL), and strengthening/investing in others (PCP).
 - a) Focus on protection and assistance to detainees: access to conflict related detainees; registration to prevent disappearance; dialogue with the - new - detaining authorities on treatment and conditions whenever needed; PFL; emergency assistance including food and water; access to health care.
 - b) PFL services in close partnership with SSRC and other relevant actors involved in managing/supporting persons displaced by conflict. Delivering on its mandate in armed conflicts, in particular on protection, including in collaboration with SSRC (e.g. PFL), and by leveraging its role as neutral intermediary for humanitarian outcomes.
 - c) Management of the Dead (MotD) in close coordination with SSRC, and in support to the relevant authorities but the latter may not be in capacity to effectively act: provision of equipment; collection/storage of dead bodies (and burial if needed); collection of data for proper recording.
 - d) PCP in Emergencies: Rappel du Droit to the parties; focus on the respect for the medical mission and the humanitarians; swift documentation to understand the main and most serious patterns of violations; short or real time interventions to address and prevent violations; coordination with the main other protection actors to address the most sensitive individual or collective cases/situations when beyond ICRC mandate and capacities (establishing new swift referral pathways).
 - e) Step up emergency prevention activities.
 - Scale lifesaving and life-sustaining response in light of dramatically increased needs: surgical capacity including MST, patient transfers, medical and material support to functioning health structures treating wounded and sick (medicines and medical materials, water). This response would focus on Juba and surroundings to start as we expect a sharp increase in wounded and sick. Over time, it could expand into other parts of South Sudan. In any case, increased resources and means will be required.
 - Emergency assistance in the initial phase will be deployed according to pre-positioned means and depending on the functionality of the logistic pipeline. It will be targeted and selective, primarily focusing on populations not served by other humanitarian actors (e.g. in detention, health structures, remote and isolated communities of displaced persons if accessible). The ICRC's emergency assistance will hence complement the response of others, not replace it. Hence, close coordination with the UN and wider humanitarian community will be required. Cooperation with and reinforcing capacities of SSRC in emergency assistance delivery will be pursued and potential increase of a reinforced Movement response with PNS and IFRC moving to an emergency posture (whilst their current response is largely focusing on specific projects NSD).
 - f) Pursue its detention activities, according to its specific mandate.
 - g) Targeted and prioritized assistance response to people affected by armed conflict, especially to communities not reached by other actors or where ICRC has a specific added value and expertise (e.g. surgical chain of care).

- h) Maintaining dialogue with authorities, the parties to the conflict and other armed stakeholders facilitating the access of Movement partners to conflict-sensitive locations where needed.
- i) Using context relevant expertise to provide technical and in-kind support on Communication, Logistics, Information Management and Security.

IFRC

The IFRC will focus on delivering on its mandate, supporting SSRC in the capacity enhancement, including the ongoing project on improving connectivity of the 21 branches of SSRC with Star-link to ensure the flow of information. Moreover, IFRC will utilize resources under the Unified Plan for preparedness and response and is considering an activation of the Federation wide response tools (DREF, Emergency Appeals (EA) and Surge (Rapid Response Personnel/ERUs) as needed to support SSRC and Movement collective response. The current CCMC ERU will continue to provide the support to SSRC in cholera response.

IFRC will focus on:

- Encouraging the support of its membership to the Movement Preparedness and Response Plan, in alignment with the decisions of the Mini-Summit and further strategic level meetings.
- Supporting SSRC in the development, implementation, and coordination of National Society Development (NSD), ensuring it is included in the Movement Response Plan and coordinating support from partners as needed.
- Supporting the 21 branches of SSRC with internet connectivity facilities via Star-link
- Activation of Federation wide response tools (DREF, EA and Surge (Rapid Response Personnel/ERUs) as needed. The IFRC role is to coordinate the membership with regards to the IFRC response, in the case of EA, and in line with the Movement overall direction.

IFRC current operations linked to the contingency plan

Given that the South Sudan Red Cross is currently managing three active emergency operations, this section provides the rationale for the ongoing Emergency Appeal and outlines response options in the context of the current political and military tensions. The objective is to guide informed decision-making on the deployment of emergency response tools and operational engagement in the conflict. Additionally, this framework offers a platform for partners to mobilize resources and contribute to the crisis response beyond existing bilateral project support.

Option 1: Review the Emergency Appeal for floods and cholera, aiming to integrate the response for Population Movement (Sudan) and Outbreaks (Mpox).

Option 2: Extend the Emergency Appeal for Floods through an Operations Update), integrating a health-focused response and allocating new resources to the evolving conflict.

Option 3: Launch a new operation in South Sudan while aiming to close the remaining operations within their timelines.

Option 4: Revise the Emergency Appeal and add different operational strategies

Given the evolving humanitarian situation, (Option 1) presents a fast and feasible approach by utilizing/revamping the existing Emergency Appeal, where integration of several approaches can be done (Population movements and outbreaks). This ensures continuity of operations without the administrative burden of launching a new appeal. However, its limited scalability and impact raise concerns about whether it can adequately address the growing needs, particularly in areas facing escalating crises. While cost-effective, this option may restrict long-term recovery efforts and the ability to adapt to worsening conditions.

An extension of the current EA (Option 2) may be a solution, but it would be limited to a flood and health response approach (Cholera); which may limit the scope of IFRC support in the response, however, it would allow the addition of a second allocation of resources from DREF funds (depending on the categorization for timing and amount to be allocated); which would require working on two operations update (Floods EA and Civil Unrest DREF). New Emergency Appeals (Option 3) provide a more neutral approach to the crisis that is highly politicized, reducing reputational risks. However, this option may introduce a significant administrative burden, delays, inefficiencies, and funding competition between the other appeals. Revise the Emergency Appeal (Option 4) In a single emergency appeal, have a single operational plan approach with different operational strategies.

8.0. OPERATION / COORDINATION STRUCTURE

8.1.1 Internal Coordination:

- SSRC will deploy the existing coordination mechanism while establishing flexibilities of these coordination mechanisms based on regular reviews of the prevailing local contexts.
- The operation will be coordinated at the Head Quarter (HQ) through the department of Disaster Risk Management (EOC) which will hold regular meetings bringing onboard key departments including Health, Organization Development, Logistics, Communication, and all supporting functions of the SSRC.

8.1.2 Existing Coordination Mechanism

- **National Task Force (NTF)**- Will be the highest coordination mechanism of the emergency response chaired by the SG. The membership will include key concerned departments, ICRC, IFRC and PNs. The main purpose of this coordination mechanism is for resource mobilization, decision making linked to key operational changes, resource allocation (material and human) and maintain clear coordination with national level actors, media and deliver a movement wide approach.
- **EOC Meetings**- Chaired by the DRM department, this will bring onboard key technical departments, delegates and support services to provide operational support. DRM department will ensure proper coordination with all technical departments ensuring seemingly flow of interventions. EOC will be providing regular situation updates to the NTF committee and maintaining regular communication with all active operations at the branches.
- **Branches**- The branches will coordinate activities of the emergency response teams (EATs/deployed NDRTs) coordinated by the Head of Branch or the EPR officers. This will comprise of tactical teams that ensure direct delivery of interventions. Regular briefings/debriefings with volunteers and staff will be carried out. The branch will also ensure participation of SSRC at cluster coordination meetings where available. All information collected regarding the emergency to be shared with HQ EOC with copy to line managers.
- **Units**- Consists of SSRC volunteers based at the community level. The volunteers will be the first boots on the ground and will ensure constant communication with the SSRC branch and will be ready for deployment as per the EAT guidelines.

8.1.3: External Coordination and humanitarian diplomacy

- SSRC will work in close coordination with all relevant line ministries at National and State level, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), County, Payam & Boma levels, INGOs, NGOs, Civil Societies, Media group and Religious Groups. SSRC will work closely with ICRC to establish and maintain critical external contacts in-case of failure or breakdown of communication.

- SSRC and ICRC continue to clarify the Movement role and response to the authorities and to any external coordination forums, ensuring the action of the Movement is adequately represented and understood. In areas where ICRC is not present, the SSRC will coordinate with the state authorities.
- Considering perception issues in this highly volatile context, we will not offer to co-lead any of the Government-led response pillars but rather continue our existing role as observers ensuring the Movement activities are coordinated with the efforts of others. The ICRC and /or IFRC as permanent observers to the UN led coordination mechanisms (HCT, ICCG at National and state level clusters) share information on behalf of the movement to avoid duplication.
- The ICRC maintains and develops when needed contacts with authorities and parties to the conflicts.
- The ICRC leads the humanitarian diplomacy engagement on the situation, on the response and need for mobilization.

8.1.4: Movement Coordination

- SSRC will work closely with all relevant movement partners ICRC, IFRC and Participating National Societies (PNS) in the country, and many others that would extend assistance during the time of violence or conflict. The Mechanism is defined within the 2021 Movement Coordination Agreement (MCA) and the Seville Agreement 2.0.

9.0 CHALLENGES THAT MAY HINDER RESPONSE

Based on previous experiences across the country, including during instances of violence, the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement has consistently been respected and granted access to those in need. Existing challenges exacerbated in times of crisis.

- Before addressing the desired identity of the movement in case of a crisis, it is equally important to consider a series of specific contextual challenges that are already difficult to manage outside of a general crisis. These challenges are expected to be exacerbated in times of crisis (OCP scenario) and add to the constraints of any Movement operations.
- Cost of doing business is significant and it keeps increasing. For example: transportation costs are growing due to increased risk premiums (linked to security and administrative challenges), multiple legal and illegal checkpoints charging transporters along roads and rivers; national fuel vulnerabilities and increased fuel costs; uncoordinated, chaotic and unpredictable regulatory frameworks creating new logistical hurdles; massive depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound.
- Very poor accessibility. South Sudan's road infrastructure is deplorable (e.g. only three tarmac roads exist in the whole country – some 500 km). With little to no maintenance (mainly carried out by UNMISS), this network is slowly degrading. Large swathes of the country are totally inaccessible due to lack of any usable road networks or due to seasonal floods/rains. River navigation and transport are possible along large parts of the Nile and connected rivers, but extremely costly, time consuming and limited in terms of reach. In “normal times” (i.e. no massive conflict and during dry season), reaching certain locations can take up to one week by road and not all locations are accessible by truck. It can take up to three months by river. Air transport is crucial for humanitarian operations. Flying remains central to reach remote locations and populations. There are numerous airstrips although many of them are degrading, have not been used for years (exacerbated by the downsizing of humanitarians), have little oversight and management on the ground, and represent an inherent risk of humanitarian work in South Sudan (several aircraft accidents recorded in 2024 alone). Air transport by helicopter remains crucial to reach the most isolated yet very populated areas, prone to violence and conflict. Only one

international airport is functional and open to international humanitarian flights (JIA), which renders the humanitarian air logistic highly vulnerable.

- Security remains highly volatile outside of any large-scale conflict and violence. It remains a limiting factor for most humanitarian actors, even though RCRC movement has privileged capacities and networks to ensure generally safe field movements. Still, South Sudan remains one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian workers (on and off duty), with multiple instances of car jackings, robberies, shootings, harassment and extortion recorded monthly.
- Centrality of Juba. Any humanitarian action across South Sudan is today highly dependent on a functioning, relatively secure and connected capital. The conflict in Sudan has worsened the prospects for any support being channeled through the northern neighbor. DRC and CAR border South Sudan in extremely remote areas with poor infrastructure and multiple operational and security challenges. Access from Ethiopia is primarily pedestrian and not scalable. Uganda and Kenya remain two options to access South Sudan but remain disconnected from traditionally conflict affected areas of South Sudan (except for the Equatorias) that can hardly be reached bypassing Juba.
- Staff resilience, health and access to health care. Working in South Sudan can be draining and is associated with numerous health risks (both physical and mental). Access to quality health care is minimal. Reasonable yet limited-service providers can be found in the capital (for limited health complications). Most moderate to severe cases would require medevac for ICRC or IFRC/ PNS mobile staff. Many South Sudanese travel abroad for medical care in normal times.

10. BUDGET

A - Preparedness Activities:			
Description	Needed Resources (USD)	Available (USD)	Gap (USD)
HR Capacities	240,000	-	240,000
Health	202,000	31,813	170,187
Protection, Gender and Inclusion	145,500	55,500	90,000
Relief and Shelter	2,999,000	250,000	2,749,000
WASH	1,431,500	62,000	1,369,500
Communication and Advocacy	41,500	21,500	20,000
National Society Development (NSD)	121,000	31,000	90,000
Total Preparedness Budget	5,180,744	451,813	4,728,931
B - Response Activities:			
HR Capacities	-	-	-
Health	629,200	6,000	623,200
Protection, Gender and Inclusion	15,000	15,000	-
Relief and Shelter	2,292,000	440,000	1,852,000
WASH	645,480	92,800	552,680
Communication and Advocacy	5,000	5,000	-
National Society Development (NSD)	248,400	37,400	211,000
Total Response Budget	3,835,080	596,200	3,238,880
Total Direct Cost (A+B)	9,015,824	1,048,013	7,967,811
Admin Cost	721,266	83,841	637,425
Grand Total	9,737,090	1,131,854	8,605,236

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